We let our cloud agents query prod (with OIDC, not secrets)

anuptalwalkar

Ugh. OIDC’s whole trust model assumes the subject of the token is the responsible party. Sounds like you are opening a door for a future security problem. OIDC is good when the end user needs short-term access validation and authorization. The claim and responsibilities of what they do are on that user. Now that you have agents involved, the user can just shrug it off, saying 'oh the AI went rogue'. You probably need a separate role for agent specific tasks that severely limits the access specific to your workload, but that is a work of its own.

motoroco

just relating my personal/professional setup, I run Pocket ID for myself and made an agent account for claude. I have it set up with limited access policies to pre-prod Cloudflare resources and Tailscale servers for occasional tasks. I really like the control I have over access, grant it just when it’s needed and only exactly as much as needed. I wish SSO didn’t require biz/enterprise plans on so many services so I could use my OIDC in more ways

rvz

Very bad idea and is just asking for the agent to breached itself via a bad prompt.

KaiserPro

I mean I get the appeal, but that does mean that your agents also have the same level of access as you, and no way to limit actions to agents. For us, most of our MCPs have non-undoable actions disabled. This is to stop agents writing a tool that recursively doing something silly.

thakoppno

> At Formal, we hate secrets. Since day one, we’ve been on a quest to drive the number of long-lived secrets in our infrastructure to zero. Pedantry alert: Private keys are secrets.