Someone reported java4shell bug in September 2026
notmine1337
402 points
110 comments
November 19, 2026
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Discussion Highlights (12 comments)
elashri
This person is a member of OpenJDK organization and a contributer but not sure if he is oracle employee.
yread
They even used the same example as Calif: AAA....A=.
fulafel
It's even titled buffer overflow.
wood_spirit
So the implication is that the LLM that assisted the Calif researchers might have read this previous bug report and not independently discovered it?
rzmmm
From califio: "I focused the audit on the JIT compiler, intrinsics, widely accessible APIs, and cryptography. Well, more precisely, I told Codex to look at those areas like any serious security researcher in 2026." Maybe simply a coincidence, but I would put my bets that the first person with the PR was also using Codex, and the model was exposed to the details of the bug.
InsidiousWombat
Nice proof that the auto-close bots are literal cancer on project that make stuff worse. It was literal bug with provided fix. All it needed is someone to have a proper look. But someone clowned a bot under a visionary thought "if nobody looked it must not be important" and here we are
darkamaul
We will never know, but there is a chance that the Calif's researcher model decided to look at the open and closed issues / PRs of the repo. Nonetheless, being able to understand the criticality of a finding, and how to exploit it are other skills, that still require supervision.
black3r
The very first referenced issue in that PR discussion sheds a bit more light on this: https://github.com/adoptium/adoptium-support/issues/1480 This PR's author says there on October 1st: "Got an email from Oracle asking me to NOT proceed with a PR until receiving approval." and then on October 28th: "It's taken over by Oracle. Nothing required from us."
kccqzy
Even earlier. The bug, SIGSEGV, was reported back in June. The original reporter isolated it to base64 in September. https://github.com/adoptium/adoptium-support/issues/1480
Botifier
Oracles comment for the merged commit is the exact same as in that PR word for word: https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/commit/5177a70b385c16f26ede19... https://github.com/openjdk/jdk/pull/32781/changes/d2f942c478...
badgersnake
Much easier to scrape the closed PRs with your LLM than actually do proper analysis I guess. Although maybe they didn’t even know their LLM was doing this.
dlor
I also found this independently ahead of disclosure and reported it to Oracle last Friday. My harness found it after a fuzzing run and then turned it into a full RCE chain in the target app I was actually scanning. The harness itself doesn't run with Internet access and I confirmed it didn't access this PR directly, but who knows if this was in the training set itself. Either way, these simultaneous disclosures are incredibly common now. The Ruby issue affecting Gitlab was not only known about for 6 months, it was publicly fixed for 6 months before someone turned it into an RCE. The fix sat on the Ruby dev branch, and it was never pulled into an actual Ruby release until after Gitlab disclosed their own 10.0 vulnerability through it. It's very common for reporters to not realize the impact of a bug, models are very good at turning bugs into RCE chains, and the volume everywhere now means security teams are basically only focused on RCEs.