Securing Elliptic Curve Cryptocurrencies Against Quantum Vulnerabilities [pdf]

meling

Call me when they have broken ECC with a real quantum computer.

jryio

Here's an interesting discussion from Section 8 - Dormant Wallets: If a nation state develops a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. Seizure of the Satoshi-era bitcoin wallets without post quantum protections would fund either rogue actors or nation states. > Indeed, some governments will have the option of using CRQCs (or paying a bounty to companies) to acquire these assets (possibly to burn them by sending them to the unspendable OP RETURN address [321]) as a national security matter. As before, blockchain’s loss of the ability to reliably identify asset owners combined with the laches doctrine [319] enables governments to argue that the original owners, through years of inaction, have failed to assert their property rights

gosub100

'Code is law' doesn't exclude quantum code.

int32_64

Is there any field with as big of gap between theory and experiment than QC? You read papers like this and think they will be harvesting all Satoshi's coins in a couple years and then you remember that nobody has even factored 21 yet on a real quantum computer.

SrslyJosh

I can't think of a less useful avenue of research in cryptography right now.

newpavlov

Dup? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47582418

vibe42

Will be pretty wild when mass migration of accounts begin. The analytics of thousands of accounts sending tokens to new accounts. Better use a VPN a migrate on an unusual hour in your time zone :D

vibe42

Ethereum has a new site for PQ research: https://pq.ethereum.org/

upofadown

You can save time by first looking at the required noise performance of these schemes. From the abstract of the paper: >On superconducting architectures with 10−3 physical error rates... So good old 0.1% noise performance again. That seems to have come from the "20 million noisy qubits to break RSA" scheme[1] from back in 2019. That level of noise performance is still wildly out of reach and for all we know might be physically impossible. [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09749

commandersaki

Quantum Cryptanalysis feels like the Y2K problem all over again.