Running coding agents without handing them my credentials

antoniomika 80 points 37 comments November 17, 2026
blog.antonio.cx · View on Hacker News

Discussion Highlights (13 comments)

theyCallMeSwift

I was originally using Agent Vault ( https://github.com/Infisical/agent-vault ), but it looks like the company behind it is putting it on end of life and SasSifying it. Will give lend a try, great timing!

yoyohello13

This is pretty interesting. I’ve been using pass and some helper scripts, but that’s local machine only.

qudat

Neat! Can this work with any http request as well? Being able to have all http requests route through lend and automatically inject secrets could be useful.

ryanczak

Docker sandboxes support secret injection. https://docs.docker.com/reference/cli/sbx/secret/set/

LeBit

Nono does that. Smolvm does that. I make use of that feature which is super neat. One problem with that though is when you need to use such a credential on a tailscale node. It bypasses the proxy of those tools.

knocte

> I often have them review each other's work too. None of them run on my laptop. They run on VMs I can throw away, Good approach. I myself found issues with a VM approach such as latency (if the VM is in the cloud), efficiency (if the VM is local) and laziness to automate the VM creation & setup. So instead I just hand the agent an unprivileged user account in my system and stop worrying. I built a little tool to setup this: https://github.com/tarsgate/skynot

saagarjha

I just don’t think I agree with these designs at all. Everyone seems to be super laser focused on “not allowing their AI to have keys” when basically giving their AI direct access to what the keys enable, optionally adding a layer of ceremony in front where you tap “approve”. I’m looking at the alert that is shown there and I don’t see anything that makes me feel like it allows for an informed choice at the time of it popping up. So then, what’s the benefit?

tmpz22

Too many people, including "CEO"s, are giving everything to every LLM and its just not a serious position to take - you wouldn't volunteer your teenage child's camera roll or their psychiatry notes and that's the level of intimacy full computer access exposes. Thank you for posting and sharing this OP, its one small step in the direction of professional development with LLMs.

h4kunamata

For bash and python scripting I just use keepassxc-cli. Tokens in general is "never exposed": keepassxc-cli show --no-password -k $KEEPASS_KEY $KEEPASS_DB "GROUP_GOES_HERE/SECRET_NAME_HERE" --attributes Password When dealing with agents, they access the tokens the same way, it is the best balance I found between keeping things safe without adding too much complexity making my life harder. It can save tho, have the code to also save access_token to the vault the same way, so no log/execution will ever show the secrets. Tokens the agents use, are read-only with the minimalist access. Never ever ever grant an agent access to any token with destructive access, unless you accepted the risks.

sooraj_sj

too complex , need to ake it simple to use

scotty79

Now ask the agents to get your credentials anyway and see if they succeed so you know if you have security or security theatre.

blop

fnox ( https://fnox.jdx.dev/ ) is another solution which is also fantastic for day-to-day human use in the cli. It works a bit like sops but can also chain multiple encryption providers, so for example you can use an encrypted age key with a fido2 provider (a yubikey for example) as the main provider of all the secrets on your computer. If you run for example `fnox exec gh`, fnox will ask you to touch the yubikey to decrypt the age key and decode the github token env var for the gh cli (fnox can also cache the decoded value for a bit, like gpg agent). You can tell the AI agent to use `fnox exec gh` to access gh without seeing the gh token. Or create a shell alias so it's transparent. It also has an MCP server and proxy server to filter API calls to remote APIs (I haven't tried that yet) it supports quite a few providers ( https://fnox.jdx.dev/providers/overview.html ): age, fido2, AWS, Azure, Google, kubernetes secrets, vault/openbao, 1password, bitwarden, keepassxc, etc. A lot of them are read/write so you can also use fnox to sync secrets across different systems.

recroad

You’re not handing them your credentials, but you are handing them something that your credentials can do.

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