Qubes OS Security in the Public Record
sciences44
86 points
15 comments
July 18, 2026
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Discussion Highlights (6 comments)
Topfi
Blast from the past for me, though primarily interacted with the complementary Whonix side of things. Not surprising to read, considering how lean Qubes was from the get-go designed to be it makes sense that most things are from resulting upstream rather than with their code. Fully aware that it was never the goal for Qubes, but I have never been able to shake the idea that one could leverage their architecture in ways beyond security hardening, especially that screenshot with MSFT Office running in its own guest got my mind spinning back then. Might be worth revisiting some old ideas I'm just recalling, especially with there having been over a decade in development across many projects focused on hypervisors by many smart people, making a few old experiments likely less impossible.
adg001
Author of the paper here; AMA.
preetham_rangu
Security claims backed by public evidence are a lot more convincing than marketing.
jmakov
Would need to create a lab and throw LLMs at it to see if they can break anything. That would be an interesting paper.
khurs
First I heard of Qubes was when Edward Snowden endorsed it https://www.qubes-os.org/endorsements/ https://xcancel.com/Snowden/status/781493632293605376
nullc
QubesOS is really fantastic, I wouldn't consider using anything less today.