How to Intercept HTTP/3 Traffic: QUIC and Qpack

anof-cyber 68 points 8 comments November 16, 2026
interceptsuite.com · View on Hacker News

Discussion Highlights (2 comments)

rbartelme

The key requirement here is the client has to trust the proxy's CA. It's a client-side MITM, and the article itself notes pinned apps reject it. QUIC's crypto is fine. HTTP/3 just stopped being a blind spot for corporate TLS-inspection boxes. It's more interesting to split tunnel designs by where the trust lives: - ngrok / Cloudflare Tunnel: the edge terminates TLS by design, and your public hostname is ordinary WebPKI. Anyone who controls a visitor's trust store (inspection appliance, malware root cert) can do exactly this, and the provider can see plaintext anyway. - iroh-style P2P QUIC: there's no CA in the loop. You dial a public key (the EndpointId), and the TLS handshake authenticates raw keys, so it's pinned by construction. Relays forward ciphertext they can't terminate. A rogue root cert gets an attacker nothing; they'd need the peer's secret key. So "can someone MITM my HTTP/3?" really comes down to "who can add to the set of keys my client trusts?" For WebPKI that's a long list. For key-addressed transports it's nobody: the trusted key is the address you dialed, unless an endpoint's secret key (or the machine itself) is already compromised.

opem

Stupidity over a vibecoded slop software?

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